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FULLE v. DUNNE: THE LIMITS OF LOCAL
REAPPORTIONMENT
By
SHELDON GARDNER*
ONLY ELEVEN YEARS have passed since the United States Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr' first acknowledged legislative districting as a
justiciable issue. Since that first entry into the "political thicket," the
Court has developed the one person, one vote principal and refined
the tests by which it determines the presence or absence of constitu-
tional infringements on the voting rights of citizens in under-represented
districts.
Between the extremes of obvious invidious discrimination, which
have summarily been struck down, and "de minimus" or uncorrectable
variations which have been allowed to stand, the Court has had to es-
tablish a multi-factor set of criteria to measure whether or not "middle
range" variances from perfection were constitutionally acceptable or un-
constitutionally discriminatory under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Under these criteria, some variances are justi-
fiable. It is the intent of this paper to examine those criteria and the
degree to which they may justify districts unequal in population.
The paper will look particularly at the application of those criteria
in the recent Cook County districting case, Fulle v. Dunne.'
HISTORY
Historically, federal courts declined to enter the "political thicket"
of legislative districting at any level-congressional, state legislative or
* Deputy State's Attorney, Civil Actions Bureau, office of the State's Attorney of
Cook County. Mr. Gardner received his B.A. Cum Laude from the University of Chi-
cago and his J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law. He was formerly a partner in
the law firm of Maragos, Richter, Russell and Gardner; founding chairperson of Project
LEAP; past state chairperson of the Independent Voters of Illinois and former secretary-
treasurer of the Illinois Housing Development Authority. Appreciation for their assist-
ance in the preparation of this article is extended to Assistant State's Attorneys John A.
Dienner III and Ellis B. Levin and legal interns Jayne Weeks Barnard and John G. Sahn,
members of the defense team on Fulle v. Dunne in the U.S. District Court, and to
Howard Primer, student at the IIT-Chicago Kent College of Law.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Unpublished memorandum opinion by Judge Hubert L. Will, 73 C 2021 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 11, 1973).
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local, considering reapportionment a political question. In 1946, when
the Supreme Court entertained a suit challenging the rural-dominated
districting plan of the Illinois General Assembly, it said:
We are of opinion that the petitioners ask of this Court what
is beyond its competence to grant. This is one of those demands
on judicial power which cannot be met by verbal fencing about
"jurisdiction." It must be resolved by considerations on the basis
of which this Court, from time to time, has refused to intervene
in controversies. It has refused to do so because due regard for
the effective working of our Government revealed this issue to be
of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial
determination.3
However, in 1960, the Supreme Court took jurisdiction in Gomil-
lion v. Lightfoot,4 a suit where black citizens of Tuskegee, Alabama
challenged a districting plan which redefined the boundaries of the city
to exclude black voters.' The Court held in distinguishing Gomillion
from Colegrove:
When a legislature . . . singles out a readily isolated segment of a
racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, it violates the
Fifteenth Amendment. In no case involving unequal weight in
voting distribution that has come before the Court did the deci-
sion sanction a differentiation on racial lines . . . . [Tihese con-
siderations lift this controversy out of the so-called "political" arena
and into the conventional sphere of constitutional litigation. (Em-
phasis added.) 6
Two years later in 1962, the Supreme Court finally acknowledged
in Baker v. Carr7 that non-racial discrimination in districting was re-
viewable under the fourteenth amendment." While recognizing that re-
apportionment legislation had a political aspect, the Court held that
any state legislation, including reapportionment, could not infringe
upon the rights of the state's citizens to fourteenth amendment protec-
tions. Justice Brennan said:
The question here is the consistency of state action with the Fed-
eral Constitution . . . . Nor need the appellants in order to suc-
ceed in this action, ask the Court to enter upon policy determina-
3. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946). This case involved a chal-
lenge to Illinois Congressional districts ranging in population from 112,116 to 914,053.
4. 365 U.S. 339 (1960).
5. Although much has been made of the gerrymandering of the square-shaped city
into one having twenty-eight sides, the shape was irrelevant to the outcome of the
case. The exclusion of black voters was the key factor.
6. 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1960).
7. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8. Much of the court's analysis in Baker with respect to vote dilution and its
analysis with respect to constitutional criteria for congressional redistricting comes from
Justice Black's dissent in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,.566-74 (1946).
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tions for which judicially manageable standards are lacking. Judi-
cial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well devel-
oped and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the en-
actment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the
particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy,
but simply arbitrary and capricious action. (Emphasis in orig-
inal.) 9
On this basis, the Court struck down a patently discriminatory Ten-
nessee legislative districting plan. 10
However, the more precise standards under which fourteenth
amendment scrutiny of challenged reapportionment schemes would go
forth were not articulated until Reynolds v. Sims."' In that case, the
Supreme Court struck down a proposed Alabama legislative plan which
had population variations of up to 41 to 1 in the Senate and up
to 16 to 1 in the House, stating that the "debasement or dilution
of the weight of a citizen's vote" can deny the right of suffrage "just
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the fran-
chise."' 2  To the extent that a districting plan infringed upon the per-
sonal right of any person to exercise the franchise in a free and unim-
paired manner, that plan would be struck down, regardless of its "poli-
tical" origin.
"We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into political
thickets and mathematical quagmires," the Court said. "Our answer
is this: a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial
protection; our oath and our office require no less of us."' 8  Subse-
quently, the Court struck down many discriminatory districting
schemes at both the congressional and state legislative level,' 4 with
9. 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
10. Approximately one-third of the voting population in the state controlled two-
thirds of the seats in the Tennessee state legislature. 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn.
1959).
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. Id. at 555 (1964).
13. Id. at 566 (1964).
14. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), the Supreme Court had first ap-
plied the one person, one vote standard to congressional districting and interpreted ar-
ticle I, § 2 of the Constitution to require that "as nearly as is practicable, one man's
vote in a congressional election be worth as much as another's." Id. at 8. In that
case, the Court found unconstitutional a Georgia districting scheme allowing congres-
sional districts ranging in population from 272,154 to 823,680. Following Reynolds'
use of a fourteenth amendment analysis, the Court in 1969 struck down a Missouri
congressional plan allowing districts ranging from 13,542 above to 12,260 below the
"perfect" district population. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). In 1973,
the Court struck down a Texas congressional plan allowing districts ranging from 11,362
above to 7,949 below a maximum 4.7 percent spread from the perfect district pop-
ulation. White v. Weiser, 93 S. Ct. 2348 h.2 (1973).
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each successive challenge attacking smaller and smaller deviations from
population equality.
Additionally, in 1968, the Supreme Court applied the ever-refined
one person, one vote doctrine to local governing bodies. In Avery v.
Midland County, 5 districts with populations of 418, 828, 852, and
67,906 each shared equal representation on a County Commission. In
that case, as in Baker, a gross numerical disparity alone was violative
of the right to equal protection for the citizens of the largest district.
In Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City,
Mo., 6 the Court extended Avery to school districts and all other elected
bodies.17
THE TESTS
The Supreme Court never required absolute population equality
between electoral districts. From the beginning, the Court recognized
that "mathematical exactitude" was not a reasonable requirement for
constitutional acceptability and that a range of variation might be per-
missible.
The tightest standards were maintained for congressional districts
which, the Court said, had to be fashioned with "a good-faith effort
to achieve precise mathematical equality."' 8  Less rigidly, the Court
stated that state legislative districts might show some more flexible vari-
ations from mathematical perfection if it could be shown that they re-
sulted from "legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of
a rational state policy .... 2 9
With respect to state legislative reapportionment plans, the Supreme Court in Ro-
man v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) rejected a plan in which the population of the
Delaware House districts ranged from 4,166 to 64,820. Three years later, in Kil-
garlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) the Court held a Texas reapportionment statute
unconstitutional which provided for a distribution of population-per-representative of
54,385 to 71,301. Also in 1967, the Court in Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967)
found invalid a plan to redistrict the Florida legislature which allowed a population
range of 34,584 to 48,785.
15. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
16. 397 U.S. 50 (1970). This case involved a challenge to the method of election
of trustees of the Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, under which Kan-
sas City, with 60 percent of the district population, elected only 50 percent of the trus-
tees.
17. For examples of lower court decisions with respect to municipal reapportion-
ment, see Shalvoy v. Curran, 393 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1968) and Cousins v. City Council
of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1972).
18. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969).
19. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964). The Court reiterated in 1973
that application of the absolute equality test of (congressional districts) may impair
the normal functioning of state and local governments. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S.
315 (1973).
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The problem does not lend itself to a uniform mathematical form-
ula, the Court said, and it is neither practicable nor desirable to estab-
lish rigid mathematical standards for evaluating the constitutional valid-
ity of a state legislative apportionment scheme under the equal protec-
tion clause. Rather, the proper judicial approach is to ascertain
whether, under the particular circumstances existing in the individual
state whose legislative apportionment is at issue, there has been a faith-
ful adherence to a plan of population-based representation, with such
minor deviations only as may occur in recognizing certain factors that
are free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.20
These factors, in the review of state legislative schemes, included
a desire to adhere to traditional or geographic boundaries,21 compact
and contiguous boundaries, 22 and political fairness in apportioning leg-
islative districts so as to maintain the current balance of party power
in the state.2 3 Even more flexible standards were carved out for devi-
ations from population equality in local governmental districts.2 4  In
the review of local legislative schemes, legitimating factors included
the desire to adhere to traditional political boundaries 25 and a desire
not to interfere with established policies of distribution of local services
or methods of intra-county cooperation. 26
The Supreme Court made clear in all these tests that "political
motivations" could be acceptable as a basis for some imperfections in
a reapportionment plan, while "political gerrymandering" to dilute the
effective votes of under-represented persons was not acceptable.
In practice, these emerging standards meant that a state legislative
scheme based on legitimate state interests might allow a total variation
from population perfection of 16.4 percent, 27 and that a local districting
scheme based on unique needs and interests might allow a total varia-
tion of at least 11.9 percent.28 Presumably, an allowable local variation
could even be significantly larger.
This expansion of the one person, one vote concept required an
extraordinary amount of time expended by the federal courts to balance
20. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
21. Id. at 578 (1964).
22. Id.
23. Gaffney v. Cummings, 93 S. Ct. 2321 (1973).
24. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971).
25. E.g., Shalvoy v. Curran, 393 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1968).
26. E.g., Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
27. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
28. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
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carefully the asserted state or local interests against the asserted dilution
of votes, to determine in each case which interest was paramount. Thus
the Supreme Court, faced with having to consider every future reappor-
tionment situation involving a numerical disparity, attempted to restore
to the legislatures much of their traditional role.
That the Court [United States Supreme Court] was not de-
terred by the hazards of the political thicket when it undertook
to adjudicate the reapportionment cases does not mean that it
should become bogged down in a vast, intractable apportionment
slough, particularly when there is little, if anything, to be accom-
plished by doing so.
.. . Involvements like this must end at some point .... 29
Therefore, the Court held in Gaffney v. Cummings30 that, before
the time-consuming balancing tests would be invoked, a prima facie
case of invidious discrimination at least had to be asserted. In Gaffney,
the Court was faced with a case where no evidence of racial or other
deliberate discrimination was present and the only issue was whether
a total numerical disparity between the largest and smallest state legis-
lative districts of 7.93 percent was sufficient to require a redistricting.
The Court concluded it was not and did not invoke the balancing tests.
In the companion case, White v. Regester,31 the Court similarly held
that, in the absence of a specific claim of racial or political discrimina-
tion, a numerical claim of 9.9 percent variation from population equal-
ity failed to present a prima facie equal protection case. Thus, the
Supreme Court has suggested in recent cases that variations of up to
10 percent need not be reviewed by the courts or subjected to the fac-
tor-balancing tests, absent specific claims of invidious discrimination.
The Court announced:
We doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment requires repeated dis-
placement of otherwise appropriate state decisionmaking in the
name of essentially minor deviations from perfect census-popula-
tion equality that no one, with confidence, can say will deprive
any person of fair and effective representation in his state leg-
islature.32
The Court then summarized the categories into which reapportion-
ment challenges might fall:
29. Gaffney v. Cummings, 93 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (1973).
30. 93 S. Ct. 2321 (1973).
31. 93 S. Ct. 2332 (1973). This case involved a challenge to the apportionment
of the Texas state legislature on the basis of population variations among the districts
and also a challenge to the several multimember districts which existed in areas of large
minority group populations.
32. Gaffney v. Cummings, 93 S. Ct. 2321, 2329-30 (1973).
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As these pronouncements have been worked out in our cases,
it has become apparent that the larger variations from substantial
equality are too great to be justified by any state interest so far
suggested. There were thus the enormous variations stricken down
in the early cases . . . as well as the much smaller, but neverthe-
less unacceptable deviations, appearing in later cases . . . . On
the other hand, as Mahan v. Howell demonstrates, population
deviations among districts may be sufficiently large to require justi-
fication but nonetheless be justifiable and legally sustainable.
It is now time to recognize, in the context of the eminently rea-
sonable approach of Reynolds v. Sims, that minor deviations from
mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insuffi-
cient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification
by the State. 33
Thus, when Fulle v. Dunne came to trial, the district court could
find the districting plan:
1. Blatantly discriminatory either by gross numerical variations
or by the exclusion of discrete classes of voters because of their race,
geography, or otherwise.
2. Justifiable and legally sustainable because of local factors
which in sum do not detract from the essential population-basis of the
plan.
3. Lacking in a numerical disparity sufficient to require full re-
view or the "strict scrutiny" of legitimatizing local factors.
FULLE v. DUNNE
On October 11, 1973, United States District Judge Hubert L. Will
issued his opinion in the case of Fulle v. Dunne. 4 This opinion ordered
the Board of Commissioners of Cook County, Illinois, to reapportion
itself by increasing the number of members allotted to the suburban
area from five to six, while leaving unchanged the ten member repre-
sentation from the City of Chicago. A few days after the order, the Cook
County Board passed an ordinance conforming to the order, and the
case ended. However, it was one which had been under consideration
for nearly a decade.
In 1966, Sherman Skolnick, a Chicago area citizen, filed suit seek-
ing to reapportion the County Board in order to increase the represen-
tation of the City of Chicago on the Board.35 An appeal was taken
33. Gaffney v. Cummings, 93 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1973).
34. Unpublished memorandum opinion by Judge Hubert L. Will, 73 C 2021 (N.D.
Ill., Oct. 11, 1973).
35. Skolnick and Hetteman v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Cook County, unpublished opin-
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on aspects of the case not relevant to reapportionment, and when the
case was finally returned to the district court, the 1970 census figures
had become available showing that the proportionate under-representa-
tion had shifted to the suburbs.3 6 Skolnick thus lost his standing to
sue and the suit was dismissed.
In 1973, the members of the County Board, armed with the new
census figures and facing an election in November of 1974, turned
again to reapportioning the Board. Floyd Fulle, a suburban County
Commissioner and one of the plaintiffs in the subsequent litigation,
filed an ordinance before the Board on January 8, 1973, by which the
Board would reapportion itself from ten city and five suburban Com-
missioners to nine city and six suburban Commissioners. After passage
of the ordinance by the Finance Committee, the total Board rejected
the ordinance. The principal reason for the reversal of position was
the strong argument of John Stroger, a black Commissioner from the
City of Chicago, that the black population in the city was seriously
undercounted in the Census of 1970. This was substantiated by a re-
port of the Bureau of the Census itself, issued shortly before the vote,
detailing its own undercount estimates. 37
With the failure of the ordinance, Fulle, together with three subur-
ban citizens, sued the remaining fourteen members of the Board, alleg-
ing that the dilution of their votes as suburban residents had denied
them equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.38
The defendants, the Cook County Board represented by the State's
Attorney of Cook County, successfully moved to have Fulle removed
from the suit as a plaintiff and added as a defendant so that the defend-
ants were the total County Board.39
In the opinion ruling on the cross motions for Summary Judgment,
the district court:
ion by Judge Hubert L. Will, 66 C. 1566 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 1968). The complaint al-
leged that the population of Chicago under the 1960 census of 3,440,404 persons (69.22
percent of the population of Cook County) elected only 67 percent of the Commissioners
(ten) while the suburban area with 1,479,321 persons (30.78 percent of the County
population) elected 33 percent of the Commissioners (five).
36. See Skolnick v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1970).
37. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Press Release on Census Un-
dercount (Apr. 25, 1973).
38. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), which provides standing
in federal court to any person for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws" against any other person who acts to violate the
plaintiff's rights under color of state law.
39. Since Fulle was suing in his individual capacity as a suburban voter, rather
than as a member of the Cook County Board, a problem might have arisen concerning
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1. Rejected the County Board's argument that the recent cases
of Gaffney v. Cummings4 ° and White v. Regester4 1 necessarily required
a showing of 10 percent deviation from population equality before it
could entertain a challenge to the plan, and accepted instead the plain-
tiff's suggestion that the numerical disparities be tested against possibly
justifiable local interests.
2. Ordered an increase in the size of the Board, based on the
"transition provisions of the new Illinois Constitution."42
3. Accepted the stipulation of the parties and integrated into its
decision the defendants' allegation of a population undercount in the
1970 Census.
In distinguishing the factual backgrounds of Gaffney and White,
the district court said,
First, this case [Fulle] involves only one county with two
divisions, not an entire State. The proposed plan requires no
alteration whatsoever to any existing geographic, political or
historic boundaries between them. Second, to the extent they are
comparable, the numerical deviation involved here is much greater
than that found in those cases. [Gaflney and White.] Third,
there are no other competing legitimate state interests to consider.
Fourth, the fashioning of fair and effective relief, could scarcely
be easier. In short, none of the complex factors which the Su-
preme Court found could reasonably be presumed to exist in the
case involving the redistricting of an entire state are present
here. 43
Further, while reiterating that the Galney and White decisions held
that federal courts are no longer required to hear reapportionment suits
just because the plaintiffs can point to some numerical deviation, the
court stated it was not precluded from scrutinizing any plan, regardless
of the smallness of its imperfections."
Finally, the court made clear that mere numbers did not define
the court's jurisdiction to enforce a mandamus against the Board if only fourteen of
the fifteen Board members had been defendants.
40. 93 S. Ct. 2321 (1973).
41. 93 S. Ct. 2332 (1973).
42. Transition Schedule, § 5(b) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides:
"mhe number of members of the Cook County Board shall be fifteen except that
the county board may increase the number if necessary to comply with apportionment
requirements." Contrast the court's action in this respect with Sixty-Seventh Minnesota
State Senate v. Beems, 405 U.S. 187 (1972) where the Supreme Court held that the
district court in fashioning a reapportionment plan could not go beyond the authority
of the legislature itself and require a larger number of senatorial districts.
43. Unpublished memorandum opinion by Judge Hubert L. Will, 73 C 2021, at
7-8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 1973).
44. Id.
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a per se invidious plan nor a "de minimis" (uncorrectable) plan, but
that each plan had to be read in light of three overriding considerations
-the population imperfections, the necessity for boundary-drawing,
and unique and justifying local factors.45
FACTOR ANALYSIS
It is these considerations-the degree of numerical imperfection,
the type of districts, and the unique local factors-which constitute the
balancing test in a judicial review of any reapportionment plan which
is neither blatantly discriminatory nor only insignificantly unequal.
I. Population
The early reapportionment cases dealt with population variances
of such magnitude that alternative methods of computing population
would have been meaningless to the decisions. However, as more re-
cent cases have dealt with increasingly marginal situations, alternative
ways of computing population have become important. It has become
necessary to examine:
1. Who is included in the population count?
2. How is the disparity from population equality best expressed?
Who is the one person named in the one person, one vote doctrine?
Is it a man, a woman, an adult, an inhabitant, a resident, a citizen,
a registered voter or an actual voter? The pragmatic response to this
question has historically been the "census person '46 simply because this
was the accepted unit of measurement used by the people doing the
reapportioning.47
Even in the face of alternative or updated sources of counting,
courts in reapportionment challenges have frequently declined to enter-
tain any figures other than census figures. 48
45. Id.
46. The accepted unit of population measurement used by reapportionment map-
makers.
47. The basic unit used to district is the census tract which contains persons who
are residents of the tract area.
48. A district court has stated:
We find that the correct basis for the apportionment of the State of
Indiana should be upon the United States Decennial Census of 1960 which isjudicially noticed even though it may be a fact that the census is outdated
and the communities of the state have grown disproportionately to population.
The eleven (11) congressmen apportioned by Congress to the State of Indiana
is based upon the census conducted by the United States and not upon any
other governmental or private census and cannot be changed until the next
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However, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require the States to use
total population figures derived from the federal census as the
standard by which this substantial population equivalency is to
be measured .... Neither in Reynolds v. Sims nor in any other
decision has this Court suggested that the States are required to
include aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or
persons denied the vote for conviction of crime . . . The deci-
sion to include or exclude any such group involves choices about
the nature of representation . . . [which the courts will leave to
the legislature unless directly forbidden by the Constitution.]49
For example, when census materials have been obviously outdated,
courts have relied on projections based on state vital statistics50 or
other alternative headcounts. 51 Evidence of shifting population pat-
terns between the censuses has been considered, 2 and at least twice
in the Supreme Court the particular counting patterns of the Bureau
of the Census have been held to be inadequate bases for reapportion-
ment districting. 3 The conclusion of the Supreme Court in this area
has been that figures other than sometimes misleading census figures
may be used as the basis for reapportionment, if they are consistent
with an acceptable population-based plan."
One of the most "misleading" and significant problems of the cen-
sus undertaking has been the undercount of all Americans, particularly
urban blacks. No census has ever counted every living person in the
United States, and some groups of persons have been even less visible,
and hence less countable, than others. The Bureau of the Census
has refined its enumerating techniques over the years but still relies
on that most elementary statistical device-the headcount. Every per-
son must be counted individually; no sampling or other statistical tech-
nique is used.
To satisfy this requirement, the Bureau recruited in 1970, an army
United States Census. We think the census of 1960 must be tolerated until
the next official census in order to maintain relative political stability.
Grills v. Branigan, 284 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D. Ind. 1968), af'd, 391 U.S. 364 (1968).
49. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-92 (1966).
50. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
51. Shalvoy v. Curran, 393 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1968).
52. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
53. In Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), the inclusion in the census
count of aliens allowed the Hawaii state legislature to use voter registration figures
instead as the basis for its reapportionment. In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315
(1973), the arbitrary assignment of the Census Bureau of Naval personnel to the area
where their ships were ported rather than where they actually lived was held to be
an inadequate basis for locating them in legislative districts.
54. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966).
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of census takers to conduct a door-to-door canvass in target neighbor-
hoods to supplement the use of mail-out, mail-back questionnaires. In
addition, the Bureau expanded its efforts to verify all data by cross-
checking reports and made more intensive efforts to count transients,
traveling salesmen, and similar individuals. 5 However, there are those
who simply refuse to be counted: fugitives from justice, men living
with women on welfare, families whose size exceeds zoning and housing
codes, individuals having contempt for authority or bureaucracy, and
those who object to the census for philosophical reasons. The net effect
of such resistance is an inevitable undercount. 56
In April 1973, the Bureau of the Census publically acknowledged
an undercount and stated estimates of its impact. "The undercount
rates . . .cannot be viewed as final or definitive," the Bureau an-
nounced, "but rather as the current best estimates. However, the range
of possible error does not appear to be very wide."' 57 The likely maxi-
mum range was estimated as between 2.3 and 2.8 percent with a
probable national average of 2.5 percent. Significantly for apportion-
ment purposes in urban areas, the estimated rate of undercount of white
persons was announced as 1.9 percent and of blacks as 7.7 percent."
Unfortunately, undercount estimates could not be applied reliably to indi-
vidual states or regions, let alone counties or cities. The migration data
on which the estimates were based were hardly accurate enough to
allow such fine calculations."
55. See Joseph Waksberg and Magaret A. Giglitto, "The Effect of Special Pro-
cedures to Improve Coverage in the 1970 Census," prepared for presentation at the an-
nual meeting of the Population Association of America, April, 1973.
56. A demographic consultant to the City of Chicago testified on the 1970 un-
dercount before the House Subcommittee on Census and Statistics, stating "there is no
way of getting a complete census count:
(1) Because the present state of the art has not yet received a complete solution
to the multitude of technical and procedural requirements of a decennial census;
(2) Because the appropriations framework of the administration and Congress
is unlikely to yield to the quantum jump in expenditures a 'perfect census'
would require;
(3) Because of the independence of the American people who don't mind
telling census and government to take a jump;
(4) Because of the encouragement by Congress itself-on the grounds of
'invasion of privacy'-and for people to refuse to participate in the census; and
(5) Because of avoidance of the census by people not wanting to be found for
legal reasons.
HOUSE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, SUBCOMM. ON CENSUS AND STATIS-
TiCS, REPORT ON ACCURACY ON THE 1970 CENSUS ENUMERATION, H.R. REV. No. 91-
1777, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970).
57. U.S. Department of Commerce News, "Census Bureau Report on 1970."
58. Id.
59. "The undercount was calculated as follows: U.S. population is estimated inde-
pendent of the census, and the census figures are then subtracted from the estimates-
the difference is the estimated amount of undercount. The estimated population is de-
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Therefore, the defendants in Fulle v. Dunne6 ° could do no more
than assert rough corrections based on the proportionate black and
white populations in the city and the suburban districts. In the parties'
stipulation of facts, the populations of Chicago and suburban Cook
County were increased by 7.7 percent for all reported blacks and other
non-whites and by 1.9 percent for all reported whites.
In response to this population adjustment, the plaintiffs amended
their complaint from seeking nine Chicago and six suburban commis-
sioners to seeking ten Chicago and six suburban commissioners. Al-
though the adjusted population figures varied the totals by only a few
percentage points, the new figures could not support the nine and six
distribution originally sought. Hence, the undercount argument pre-
sented in pre-trial conference by the representatives of the Cook County
Board made a significant difference in the plaintiff's strategy.
Continued advances in the technology of undercount estimating
may give added impetus to courts' willingness to vary in the future from
reported census figures as the sole reapportionment basis.
Even having isolated a population basis, the courts in reviewing
reapportionment plans have not developed a systematic approach to
measuring the degree of disparity between districts. Generally they
have adopted only those methods of measurement presented by the con-
testing parties. Basically, these methods are:
(a) measuring vote "dilution" of an individual voter against a
fully-weighted vote;
(b) measuring the variance between over and under-represented
districts; and
(c) measuring the minimum percent of (over-represented) dis-
tricts necessary to control the legislature.
Computing the minimum percent of population necessary to elect
a majority was a key technique to the historical development of reap-
portionment theory. Beginning with Baker v. Carr,61 the concept of
rural or geographic domination of state legislatures was the underlying
theme of the one person, one vote doctrine. No better method
could exist to support this contention.
The Supreme Court noted in Reynolds v. Sims62 that a legislative
reapportionment plan allowing 25.1 percent of the population to elect
veloped by utilizing available figures on births, deaths, medicare enrollment, immigra-
tion-emigration, past census data and a complex analysis of age-sex-race distributions."
Id.
60. Plaintiffs' amended complaint, Fulle v. Dunne, 73 C 2021 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
61. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
62. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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a majority to the Alabama state Senate and 25.7 percent to elect a
majority to the House was utterly lacking in rationality. The Court
accepted this method of calculating numerical disparity because it re-
flected a most basic proposition of representative government-it de-
scribed the degree of minority control over the legislative bodies and
the undesirable absence of majority rule.
Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative
government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the people
of a State could elect a majority of that State's legislators. To
conclude differently, and to sanction minority control of state leg-
islative bodies, would appear to deny majority rights in a way that
far surpasses any possible denial of minority rights that might
otherwise be thought to result.63
However, this method of calculation proved to be less and less conclu-
sive as the challenged numerical disparities became finer.64
A more frequently applied method of measuring numerical dispar-
ity has involved the concept of population variances between districts.
First the Court looked at the ratio between the most over-represented
and the most under-represented district. In Reynolds, for example, the
Court explained that population variance ratios of up to 41 to 1 existed
in the Senate, and up to about 16 to 1 in the House. 65  This meant
63. Id. at 565.
64. For example, if the court had computed the minimum per cent needed to
elect a majority to the County Board and relied exclusively on this method, a reappor-
tionment probably would not have resulted. Briefly, the computation would have been
as follows: Each Chicago Commissioner represents 351,487 persons and this is the mini-
mum number needed to elect a single Commissioner (each suburban Commissioner rep-
resents 434,434 persons). Eight (8) Commissioners form a majority of the Board-
eight times 351,487 equal 2,811,896 or 49.44 percent of total Cook County population.
Thus, a minimum of 49.44 percent of Cook County population could elect a majority
to the County Board. This method of computation hardly describes the degree of nu-
merical disparity measured by other methods.
65. The ratio was calculated as follows:
number of representatives number of representatives
in most over-represented in most under-represented
district district
population in most over- population in most under-
represented district represented district
OR, in Reynolds: Senate calculation:
Lowndes County Jefferson County1 1
15,417 634,864
or 41:1
House calculation:
Bullock County Mobile County
2 3
13,462 314,301
or 16:1
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that the vote of an Alabama citizen in the most over-represented Sen-
ate district was equal to the votes of 41 citizens in the most under-
represented district. No interpretation of the equal protection clause
could reconcile this degree of numerical disparity.
The ratio method of calculating variance was supplemented by
establishing an "ideal" district and measuring the over and under-repre-
sentation of the extremes.6 6  For example, in Swann v. Adams6 7 the
Supreme Court found that a Florida senatorial districting plan allowing
a 15.09 percent over-representation and a 10.56 percent under-represen-
tation (when compared to an "ideal" district) and a House plan allow-
ing a 18.28 percent over-representation and a 15.27 percent under-rep-
resentation was constitutionally unallowable.68 A second supplemental
method of computing the variance has been a measure of the average
over and under-representation when compared to an ideal.69
The 1973 cases have uniformly utilized as an expression of imper-
fection the maximum percent divergence by totalling the extreme over-
represented plus the extreme under-represented district compared to an
ideal district.7 0 However, the simplest expression of vote dilution, the
very basis of the equal protection analysis, has gone virtually unused
since its appearance in Reynolds. This is the measurement of the least-
weighted vote against the full or undiluted vote. For example, if legis-
66. The ideal district is found by dividing the total area population by the number
of representatives.
67. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
68. Percent over and under the ideal representation was calculated as follows:
the "ideal" senate district has a population of approximately 103,160. The most under-
represented district had 114,053 persons and the most over-represented had 87,595. Per
cent over and under was found by dividing the difference between (a) the most popu-
olus district by the number of persons in the ideal district or:
114,053
- 103,160
10,893 - 103,160 = 10.56 percent under-representation
and (b) the least populous district also by the number of persons in the ideal district
or:
103,160
- 87,595
15,565 - 103,160 = 15.09 percent over-representation
69. Average percent variation is computed by calculating the percent of over-
or under-representation for each district and dividing the absolute sum of those varia-
tions by the number of districts.
In Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), the Supreme Court made a very exten-
sive analysis of a plan to reapportion the Virginia General Assembly, which included
consideration of the percent of average variance from the ideal of ±3.89 percent. The
plan was held constitutionally allowable.
70. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 93 S. Ct.
2321 (1973); White v. Regester, 93 S. Ct. 2332 (1973).
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lative district "A" has one-half the population of legislative district "B,"
the voter in district "A" has a vote as powerful as two voters in district
"B." Concomitantly, the votes in district "B" have been diluted by one-
half.
This simple expression was perhaps the most persuasive statistic
presented by the plaintiffs in Fulle v. Dunne.71  An analysis of the
meaning of these various methods of expressing the disparity from pop-
ulation equality may in the future lead courts to demand one or another
of them, rather than merely accepting the calculations of counsel.
I. Districts
In evaluating redistricting plans, courts must look at districts in
three ways:
(1) What type of governmental unit (e.g., federal, state or local)
is involved?
(2) How many districts are involved?
(3) Are the districts single-member, multi-member, or a mixture
of both?
The federal courts apply stricter standards when dealing with con-
gressional reapportionment than when dealing with state or local redis-
tricting. The difference is based upon the fact that congressional re-
districting is governed by article 1, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution,
while state and local redistricting is based upon the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The difference is illustrated by
companion cases, one dealing with redistricting of a congressional dis-
trict and one with state legislative districts in Texas, handed down by
the Supreme Court on June 18, 1973. The Court upheld a plan allow-
ing a 9.9 percent maximum variance for state legislative districts72 while
it found constitutionally unallowable a congressional reapportionment
variance of 4.7 percent.73  The law allows even greater flexibility in
scrutinizing deviations from perfection in local plans than in reviewing
state redistricting.
A second consideration is the number of districts involved in the
plan. The Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims took cognizance of the
practical problems involved in reapportioning a large number of dis-
71. Unpublished memorandum opinion by Judge Hubert L. Will, 73 C 2021
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 1973).
72. White v. Regester, 93 S. Ct. 2332 (1973).
73. White v. Weiser, 93 S. Ct. 2348 (1973).
74. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964).
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tricts and allowed a variation.75  By contrast, Fulle v. Dunne76 rejected
the argument of Cook County that the 9.74 percent variation fell within
the 9.9 percent spread allowed in White v. Regester," pointing to the
fact that only two districts were involved, which could more easily be
reapportioned. 78
While complexity is one rationale for the distinction between situ-
ations involving few and many districts, another is the sheer numbers
of people involved. Where over 11 million people are divided into
59 state legislative districts, a ten percent variation between districts
may involve only 18,000 voters, while a ten per cent variation between
two districts electing a county board representing a population of 5.6
million may involve 275,000 voters. Thus, a statement of percentage
difference may be meaningless standing alone.
Finally, the Supreme Court has, for the most part, treated multi-
member districts the same as single-member districts. In Fortson v.
Dorsey79 the Court rejected a challenge to a multi-member districting
plan, stating that in the absence of deliberate discrimination or a grossly
unacceptable population variation, the use of multi-member districts is
constitutionally acceptable. In Whitcomb v. Chaviss° the Court reiter-
ated that multi-member districts are not themselves discriminatory ei-
ther to persons within them or to voters in surrounding single-member
districts. The Court then laid down a test for finding multi-member
districts discriminatory toward racial minorities: that such districting
not only reduces the number of legislative seats to which the minority
group is able to elect its members, but that the political process lead-
ing to nomination and election is not equally open to participation by
members of the group. The Court found this test to have been satis-
fied in the Dallas county apportionment plan challenged in White v.
Regester.1
The issue of districts will continue to be faced in future reappor-
tionment challenges, particularly as the concept of "representation"
rather than the mere numerical "weight" of a vote is expanded. It
may be incumbent at some point to determine a congressional, state,
75. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
76. Unpublished memorandum opinion by Judge Hubert L. Will, 73 C 2021 (N.D.
111. Oct. 11, 1973).
77. 93 S. Ct. 2332 (1973).
78. Unpublished memorandum opinion by Judge Hubert L. Will, 73 C 2021, at
6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 1973).
79. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
80. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
81. 93 S. Ct. 2332 (1973).
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or local district's optimum population for representational purposes or
to further review the representational advantages of single-member,
multi-member, or at-large elections.
III. State and Local Factors
State and local factors are those matters which a legislative body
may weigh and consider in the drawing of district boundaries. Presum-
ably, the gerrymandering of one legislator's voting support to effectively
deny him re-election in his new district is not a legitimate consideration.
Certainly the construction of districts to exclude completely a ra-
cially identifiable group of voters 2 or to minimize the effective strength
of that group in each of several districts" is not legitimate. Adherence
to political or geographic boundaries, or allowances for a partisan
power balance may be considered, but only to the extent that they do
not supersede the essential population basis of a reapportionment
plan.
8 4
Fulle v. Dunne introduced a new local consideration, which was
the knowledge that the census figures which the County Board was
using did not make allowance for a significant undercount of the city's
black population. While the district court acknowledged that this was
a legitimate factor in the assignment of voting districts, it was not in
this case a sufficient factor to justify the amount of vote dilution experi-
enced by suburban voters. The opinion denied the presence of other
legitimate local factors and held the 10-5 apportionment of the
County Board unconstitutional.
Certainly in the future, new challenges to legislative boundary
drawing will raise other assertions of unique local needs. Considera-
tions of such governmental interests as maintaining a city/suburban de-
lineation,"' or providing for growth of subdivisions, or allowing com-
pensatory districting in impacted minority group areas may all be ju-
dicially tested for their validity.
CONCLUSION
Since Baker v. Carr, and particularly since Reynolds v. Sims, the
Supreme Court has been polishing the one person, one vote doctrine
82. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
83. Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1972).
84. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
85. This governmental interest is also being challenged in the unrelated contexts
of school desegregation and exclusionary zoning.
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conceived to limit the problem of vote dilution. Between the extremes
of unallowable gross disparities and the unfulfillable plea for mathe-
matical exactitude, the Court has fashioned flexible standards for test-
ing reapportionment challenges to plans of substantial imperfection.
The issues it has confronted to date have included political as well as
racial dilution of votes, the differing needs of federal, state and local
forms of government, the problems of counting, and, to some extent,
the substantive nature of representation.
Challenges, of course, will be continued by petitioners who wish
to change existing governmental structures. It is incumbent upon the
judicial system to scrutinize these challenges carefully and deliberately,
and it has been toward that end that this analysis of the elements of
reapportionment review has been prepared.
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